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Abstract: David Greig’s The Events (2013) stages the aftermath of a traumatic
event; a cleric tries to come to terms with the massacre of her multicultural choir.
The play uses two actors (one playing the cleric, and the other playing all the
other main roles, including that of the killer). The cast, however, also includes a
choir, drawn from the town where the show is being performed: the choir sings,
and takes on small speaking roles (reading their lines from the script). They also
serve as an audience for the action, occupying tiered seating at the back of the
stage. The choir serves as a powerful reminder of what Laura Cull, in Theatres of
Immanence: Deleuze and the Ethics of Performance (2012) identifies as Deleuzian
immanence: a performance which stages “the participation, multiplication and
extension of the human body – understood as that which is produced by relations
of force and encounters with the affects of other bodies” (10). In this article, I
argue that the strong affect generated by the play in performance stems mainly
from the positioning of the choir, the performers and the audience as, simulta-
neously, participants and witnesses to trauma; and from the immanent relation of
actors, choir and audience within the structure of the performance event.
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At the end of the Actor’s Touring Company’s production of David Greig’s The
Events, we are asked to join a choir. Not necessarily to sing – as the play’s central
character, Claire, points out, “Nobody feels like singing all the time” (68) – but to
be there, first of all, and then to join in with the singing if we want to. As she
invites us to participate, the choir on stage start to sing; a simple, comforting
tune, based on the repeated words ‘We’re all here’. After what we know has
happened in the play to Claire, and to the choir she leads, the music and the
words feel like a blessing; a reassertion of community, of empathy, of peace, to
stand against the violence she and the choir have endured. This moment of
comfort, however, is compromised by the song itself; it is in a minor key and,
rather than singing the title of the song, a proportion of the choir – no more than
a quarter, according to the play’s information pack – sing ‘I’m not here’. It is a
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simple, musical trick; but when I saw the play, at Lincoln Arts Centre in 2014, the
strength of my reaction caught me entirely by surprise. I am, like most profes-
sional performance academics (and probably like most academics), innately
suspicious of moments in performance that are designed to elicit an emotional
response. We tend to assume that such moments are in some way meretricious;
they appeal to our irrational selves, because the issues raised in performance are
too troubling to be resolved in any other way. At the play’s end, academic
distance – that learned, objective reaction – seemed not only inappropriate, but
unethical; far better to acknowledge the fragility of the resolution, far better
simply to feel.
I am aware that this makes my response sound like a decision; but, in the
moment, it was like all emotional responses unconscious and immediate. It was
the kind of directly empathetic response which is, according to Stephen di
Benedetto, part of our ingrained awareness of the external world:
We simulate the expressions and the emotions of the people around us. Therefore, we are
primed to make the emotional journey presented within theatrical expression and its effects
are greater than we can possibly imagine. We are inherently social beings and our own
psychological states are tied to those we perceive around us. The more we are in contact
with each other, the more we are tied into the social. As live theatre is a shared experience,
simply our proximity to others during the event affects our response: therefore, the uncon-
scious affect of sensorial stimulation is intrinsic to the theatrical event. (di Benedetto 15)
In other words, what I experienced was a form of social mirroring. I was a
spectator, observing a performance based on a traumatic event – an event whose
precise details had been rehearsed and picked over in news report after news
report. I was primed, by my knowledge of the underlying narrative, by the staging
of the play, and by the response of those around me; my emotional reaction was,
it might seem, an entirely involuntary response to the emotional ambience that
surrounded me.
At first glance, this might appear the banal restatement of a banal truth; we
are social beings, and we respond socially – this much we know already. How-
ever, as di Benedetto goes on to point out, any such emotional response is never
that simple. It is both active and passive; simultaneously a response to, and a
comment on, the events presented. It is, in Josephine Machon’s useful term,
synaesthetic. Machon first applies this term to the work of immersive and partici-
patory theatre companies (most notably, she was the first academic to analyse the
work of companies such as Punchdrunk). Synaesthetics, as Machon defines it,
encompasses theatre which aims to establish the kind of visceral response di
Benedetto describes, and also what Machon calls “a fused and sensate approach
to artistic process and analysis”: “(syn)aesthetics [sic] provides a discourse that
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defines simultaneously the impulse and processes of production and the subse-
quent appreciation strategies which incorporate reception and interpretation”
(14). An emotional response, in this typology, is therefore both visceral and
analytical; one might say that it is analytical because it is visceral – the power of
a strong emotional response calls for an almost instantaneous ‘appreciation
strategy’ to frame and to analyse it. If, following Machon, I would claim that my
response to The Events was synaesthetic – that is, that it was both emotional and
analytical – then what I would also have to acknowledge was that my response
was, as I have suggested above, a fundamentally ethical one. It was a moment of
witnessing, at least as defined by Simon Shepherd in Theatre, Body and Pleasure
in 2006. Shepherd points out, in terms that echo di Benedetto, that theatre is “an
art of bodies witnessed by bodies” (73). He argues that, in the theatre, the moment
of witnessing can be thought of as a physical act:
The audience members as witnesses are physically engaged by that which is present to
them, to the extent that they might be physically possessed by it. One of the outcomes of
possession is that the audience members attempt, during a performance, to assert out loud,
to announce publicly, the truths they believe exist – ‘Don’t believe him’, ‘Look out behind
you’, ‘Oh yes it is!’. (73)
Or an involuntary, affective response such as tears, which takes the spectator
entirely by surprise. As Shepherd notes, the act of witnessing is at base an ethical
act; it is based on the truths we believe exist – and, one might add, rather than
truths we rationally deduce from our experience of the world, truths which we
have internalised so deeply that their expression is involuntary.
My reaction, then, was in itself a form of witnessing, as described by Shep-
herd; in the moment, it felt like the synaesthetic expression of a truth I believed –
a truth about the relation between communities and between the individual self
and those defined as Other. In describing my synaesthetic response to the play as
the expression of a deeply felt truth about the relation between Self and Other, I
am aware that I have strayed into ethical territory which has already been
exhaustively mapped out. The idea of an ethics founded on the encounter
between self and Other derives from the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’s
ethics is founded on the idea of a life lived, not for the self, but for the Other –
even though the Other will remain fundamentally unknowable. He defines the
impulse behind his ethical philosophy as:
Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to come along. A
responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or whatever
acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being
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devoted to myself. Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the other’s death even before
being. (83; emphasis original)
Levinas’s ethics is founded on the idea of a face-to-face encounter with the Other;
as Nicholas Ridout has noted, when his thought is adapted to performance, much
of what makes Levinas distinctive as an ethicist (the implicit theology of his
thought, his austerity) is leeched away. Ridout points out, in passing, that such a
dilution runs the risk of converting Levinas’s ethics into another version of the
“mundane liberalism” that is British theatre’s default ethical setting:
[In the] transfer across from Levinas’ philosophy to theatre and performance, much of what
was distinctive about Levinas [is lost]. It removes the unknowability and anonymity of the
face; it dilutes the absolute quality of the demand to infinite responsibility; it obscures the
idea that the self comes into being only through this encounter with, and infinite subjection
to, the other. […] Serious Levinasians would no doubt retort that the ethics left behind after
this ‘misappropriation’ is [… an ethics] in which we are wearily enjoined to be nice to each
other, and is thus of no use to anyone. (55)
Interestingly, it could be said that The Events begins at the point at which this
‘mundane liberalism’ collapses; but, arguably, the events, and what they reveal
about the world that Claire inhabits, also illustrate a potential weakness in
Levinas’s ethical framework. Claire, the minister who runs the choir, could be
termed an applied Levinasian ethicist: the choir she forms exists as much as a
series of face-to-face encounters with the Other as it does as a musical ensemble.
After the shooting, that ethical framework seems not ridiculous, but profoundly
inadequate – so inadequate that it cannot even be expressed:
I ran a choir that brought together vulnerable people, old people, asylum- seekers, immi-
grant men, young mums and so on – it was a – the idea was – you can imagine.
We sang. (14)
In the aftermath of the shooting, Claire finds herself lost in a different, starker
moral universe; one in which an encounter between self and Other is impossible.
Simply, he is the only person in the play with an identity that is fixed. The Boy is
not only the killer; he is her lover, the boy’s father, the leader of a far-right
organisation, the person who talks Claire out of jumping to her death – all the
different faces, all the others she meets bear the face of the killer. She cannot meet
them, because she cannot see them; all she can see is the Boy, everywhere.
Neither does she have a stable encounter with the choir; we know, as an audi-
ence, that different choirs will go through the performance with her from night to
night. Even the Boy cannot give her the certainty of a fixed identity; he cannot
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explain himself to her – the best he can offer is, “If I talk – I get – discombobu-
lated” (65). Moreover, the Boy, in one of his guises (as the leader of a far-right
group), puts the case against diversity in the language of reactionary common
sense:
The values we live by are under threat, our heritage, our traditions.
That might mean nothing to you, but it means everything to me. […]
Schoolgirls killed for going to school, mobs dancing on embassy roofs, burning books, what
do you think would happen to you if you lived in Arabialand, Claire? Or Afghanistan? What
do you think they do to lesbians? What’s your general impression of the way little lesbian
girls get treated in Islamic countries?
It’s people like you who try to erase difference.
It’s you people who won’t call black ‘black’ and white ‘white’. (35)
This is an ethical position (even if I have some difficulty in using the term in
relation to this speech – a sure sign of the ‘mundane liberalism’ of my own ethical
framework). It operates by reversing Levinasian ethics; the Other is encountered
only to be rejected – on the very basis that the Other is unknowable; it argues that
the self is only knowable through the infinite rejection of the Other. It is in itself a
demand to infinite responsibility; and it is also a form of infinite subjection to the
Other – to the extent that the figure of the Other is to be abjured utterly. I will not
understand your world, because you are incapable of understanding mine. It is
here that ‘mundane liberalism’ is at its most vulnerable – it can be defeated by a
simple ‘no’.
This, though, is not the only time in the play that a Levinasian ethical frame-
work falls apart. Later, the Boy (this time as the Boy) answers, or seems to answer,
the question that Claire, the Choir, and we most want him to address – the simple
question, “What are you?”:
I am a Europe-wide malaise
I am a point in the continuum of contemporary masculinity
[…]
I am unique
I am typical
I am the way things are going
I am the past.
I am the product of the welfare state
I am the endpoint of capitalism,
I am an orphan
A narcissist
A psychopath
I am a void into which you are drawn. (53)
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This in its turn reverses the ethical position outlined above; the rejection of the
Other is based on the idea of essential difference – and here, the Boy (in Claire’s
imagination) tells us that he has no essence. He is an absence, and as such, he is
not accessible to Levinasian ethics – he is unknowable, not because he is differ-
ent, but because there is nothing to know. So Levinasian ethics are, in this case,
revealed as doubly insufficient – they can be reversed, turned into a negative
version of themselves; and they can be effaced, if the essential nature of the Other
is denied or ignored. The stable identities assumed in Levinasian ethics no longer
exist. The play, then, does not provide us with an ethical framework in which the
anonymous Other is encountered and ethically accommodated. How, then to
account for the strongly emotional and ethical charge of the final moments of the
performance?
To answer that question, I would like to return to my initial reaction to the
performance. That reaction was sparked (as much as I can reconstruct the mo-
ment) by a number of things – the restraint in the writing, and the similar restraint
in Amanda Drew’s performance as Claire – but also, and most directly, by the
nature of the choir themselves. Each time the play was performed, it used a
different choir, drawn from the local area. The choir members prepared and
rehearsed the songs; there was a multiple choir rehearsal (in which all the choirs
working on the show came together), and a pre-show rehearsal, with a call two
hours before the show went up. Choir members had lines and actions, but they
performed with scripts in hand, reading, rather than acting. In a play where one
of the characters, the Boy, shifted identity from line to line, they were always
themselves; both a part of the performance and its audience – participants, rather
than performers. At the play’s end, the choir face us; the response they implicitly
demand is not a distanced appreciation of their skill, but an acknowledgement of
the human loss their participation indicates.
The ending of the play suggests the participation of this choir is in some way a
surrogate for the participation both of the fictional choir (whosememberswe never
see) and the audience themselves. This is an idea that the performance plays on:
when the choir is not required, the singers sit on a row of benches at the back of the
performance space, facing us, watching the actors, as we do. They line up and, one
by one, ask the Boy the questions that we might want to ask someone whose
behaviourwe cannot understand – “Your actionswill be shocking tomany people,
many people will ask – why do you kill?” (20). When Claire desperately tries to
exorcise the memory of the shooting, she asks the choir to take part in a shamanic
purging ritual, and the choir mirror what would probably be the audience’s
awkward, rather embarrassed response. At the same time, the choir fits more
closely to the world of the performance than the audience ever could; they bring
their craft, their musical skill, to bear at key parts of the narrative – an a cappella
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version of “Bonkers”, a haunting solo voice, singing as Claire imagines smothering
the killer at birth. Our relation with the choir is therefore never settled; we look to
them to mirror our response to the performance, but they only mirror us some-
times – and at others they are performers, as distanced from us as the actors
themselves.
The choir, then, are ambiguously placed in the world of the play; they are
both part of the fictional universe the performance establishes, and also separate
from it – part of the world occupied by the audience. As such, our relation to them
is different than our relation to the two stable performers who, we know, carry the
text with them from theatre to theatre. What we experience in relation to the
choir, it could be argued, is something based on an ‘aesthetics of undecidability’
(to borrow a term from Hans-Thies Lehmann): “The irruption of the real becomes
an object not just of reflection (as in Romanticism) but of the theatrical design
itself. This operates on a number of levels, but in an especially revealing way
through a strategy and an aesthetics of undecidability concerning the basic means
of theatre” (100; emphasis original). Lehmann’s term, however, needs to be
adapted for this particular text and performance. It is not simply that the irruption
of real people into a fictional universe can be objectively understood as contribut-
ing to a new theatrical aesthetic; it is that the presence of the choir changes the
relation between the spectators and the performed world. They are our represen-
tatives on stage, but they mirror us; we are their representatives in the theatre,
mirroring their response to the text that they help to create. We have, in effect,
something more complex than the idea of the choir as simple audience surro-
gates; as Helena Grehan points out, this suggests a particular ethics of perfor-
mance, one which complicates a strictly Levinasian approach to the subject. For
Levinas, as noted above, the idea of theatricality itself militates against an ethical
encounter with the Other, because it strives to make the Other knowable; Grehan
argues that the incorporation of elements drawn, as the audience would see it,
from the world beyond the performance will change the relation between the
spectator and the event. It introduces an ambivalence into the creation and the
reception of the performance:
Ambivalence is a key aspect of contemporary life. Instead of seeing ambivalence as some-
thing that leads to stasis or inertia, it should be reimagined as an unsettling and productive
space. Neither ambivalence nor undecidability necessarily imply that the subject will
flounder or experience paralysis in terms of decision making […]: rather, it may generate an
environment in which subjects become aware of their obligation to respond, as well as of the
unstable or contingent nature of any response they might make. Ambivalence is understood
here as a radical unsettling. (34–35)
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Grehan’s 2009 monograph, Performance, Ethics and Spectatorship in a Global Age,
deals with such moments; moments where the performances she discusses create
this sense of a radical unsettling, which demand an ethical response in the instant
of perception. Where I think her argument does not quite go far enough is in
acknowledging the spontaneous nature of this ambivalence. Useful as Grehan’s
idea of ambivalence as an ethical demand is, her argument still follows a succes-
sive logic. The moment happens, the moment is experienced, and an ethical
response forms after the moment is absorbed. My response to the event of The
Events was instantaneous. All the moments crowded in together; and as I have
said, I could not separate the moment from my response to the moment. They
were part of the same productive, unsettling, ambivalent experience.
In a 2012 monograph, Laura Cull attempts to come to terms with moments
like these in performance: moments that demand a response that is both affective
and ethical. They are, as she rightly points out, moments of immanence; in an
analysis drawn from her reading of Deleuze, Cull argues that
immanence precisely concerns the participation, multiplication and extension of the human
body – understood as that which is produced by relations of force and encounters with other
bodies. Our sense ofwhere andwhen the human body ‘is’may be dispersed in this model, but
it is less a matter of us losing sight of ‘the human’ as it disappears into ‘a world of intensity
flows’ andmore a question of gaining a sense of humanness as an open quality. (10)
This argument is relevant to the performance of The Events in two ways. Firstly,
the experience that Claire lives through is itself a moment of profound, immedi-
ate, and shocking transformation, produced by a disruptive encounter with
another body, in which relations of force are brought to bear on her and on those
she has come to care about. Moreover, the new ethical universe in which she finds
herself is one in which the kind of immanence Cull describes above is a guiding
principle. Her sense of where and when the human body is, is dispersed; the
multiplication of the human body – the Boy appearing everywhere – is for her not
the means through which an ethical philosophy could be constructed, but a sign
of the horror she has lived through. For her, for most of the play, humanness is an
open quality, but it is only open to one other human – a human being linked to
trauma, infinitely present, but (at least for Claire) ethically and affectively empty.
Secondly, the staging of the performance ensures that our response to the work
is, like Claire’s, founded in the idea of immanence. Here, the nature of our and
Claire’s relation to the choir is key. In this new, painful and ethically uncertain
world, the Choir become her, and our, fixed point of reference, not because they
provide her and us with the reassurance of stable identity, but because what they
do – the craft and skill they bring to the performance – is based on one of the
defining characteristics of human identity, the individual voice.
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Deena Weinstein, in a 2004 article entertainingly called “All Singers Are
Dicks”, discusses the relation between singers and other musicians in rock bands.
She points out that singers are often treated as marginal figures, because, unlike
guitarists, bassists, keyboard players and drummers, their instruments are part of
their physical selves:
The voice is part of the person, not a thing that can be carried, set up by others, or replaced
for a better model. Like an athlete’s body, the voice is vulnerable. It doesn’t get played as
much as it gets expressed, and its expression is influenced by the physical and mental
condition of the person. Tired or energetic, with a head cold or in good health, depressed or
happy, singers reflect their states of being in their vocal performances. (324)
The act of singing is a personal act; it connects us – immanently – with the
physical reality of the singer. As Weinstein says, it is a reflection of the singer’s
state of being. Added to this, as Weinstein also points out, is the fact that the
singer occupies what might be called an immanent place in the performance of
music; the vocalist shapes and crafts something which is recognisably part of a
designed artwork – and yet, at the same time, the singer is also separate from the
band, and the quality of attention paid to the singer by the audience is different
from that paid to the other musicians. The singer is present to us; his or her
response to us and to the music is a crucial component of the audience’s own
perception of the event. Weinstein’s article deals with singers who are frontmen
in rock; she is therefore looking at performers who are aware that, to be effective,
they must adopt a performance style that is theatrically heightened. In The Events,
it could be said, the various choirs achieve the same effect, but in reverse. The
rock singer’s heightened theatricality contrasts with the other musicians, who
tend to be assessed on their craft skills – their ability to play their instruments,
and to recreate or build on recorded versions of the music.
In The Events, the choir are the ones who display those craft skills, in contrast
to the theatrical registers employed by the actors playing Claire or the Boy. The
effect, though, is the same; in both cases, our attention is drawn to those operating
in a register which distinguishes them from the dominant style of the performance.
The choirs bring their craft to The Events; but the nature of that craft, inevitably,
establishes a connection between them and us that is closer, more intimate, than it
iswith theperformers. Theyare the incarnationof the immanenceofTheEvents: the
site of theparticipation,multiplication, and extensionof thehumanbody.Asnoted
above, they are our representatives in performance, and the play’s representatives
in our world. But they are something more; the skill they bring to the performance
is, of allmusical skills, the one that seems closest to theworld of the audience. They
have voices; they bring that craft to the performance – and the voice, as Weinstein
says, is part of theperson.Weall haveavoice –andweall can sing.
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It is not simply that the act of singing unites us with the choir; the experience
of listening itself rests on our awareness of the physicality and the emotional
condition of the person singing:
More than this, the experience of listening is itself inherently affective –
Representation and interpretation, for example, are issues in which sound shares with
pictures and text, yet sound reconfigures these very issues by inflecting representation with
affect, and interpretation with embodiment. The act of listening is not an activity done
remotely; it inevitably invokes corporeality, it envelops listeners, and […] it resounds within
the body. The types of ‘literacy’ involved with listening are strikingly complex; they not only
exceed but challenge the conventions of visual and textual models. (Drobnick 10)
The point that Jim Drobnick makes is one that covers all uses of sound in
performance; it can be applied to an audience’s experience both of designed
sound environments (soundscapes, the use of music, and so on) and to the
vagaries of vocal tone and delivery, as well as to those sounds produced as a by-
product of the performative process. Our relation to the singing of the choir in The
Events, however, is not quite as simple as Drobnick suggests; certainly, the music
they create combines representation and affect, but it does more than inflect the
first term with the second. Implicit in Drobnick’s argument is the idea that
representation is the dominant term; that what we see and understand as a
representation in performance is coloured by the aural environment in which we
see it. This might capture the relation between sound, image and event in drama,
live art, immersive theatre, and other forms of performance where audiences are
enjoined to interpret representations; it does not, however, capture the relation
between sound, image and event in live music performance. Here, more com-
monly, affect is inflected by representation; the structure of the event, and the
images created in performance, are designed to reflect and enhance the corporeal
impact of the music. The Events switches between these two performance styles;
at some points, theatrical sound (the delivery of the text, the sounds produced by
the stage furniture and by the movement of the performers’ bodies) predominates
and inflects our understanding of the events represented. At other times, though,
we hear music; and the theatrical elements are subordinate, and inflect, the
affective embodiment which is an inescapable part of our response to any sound.
The choir in The Events, then, is not simply a way of extending the audience
into the playing area. The particular nature of their craft, and the fact that these
voices emanate from people who are dressed, who are positioned, and who hold
themselves on stage in a fashion which demonstrates that they have not been
drilled in the performance in the same way that the professional actors have,
mark them out as indeterminate figures, half-way between the stage and us. The
skill they bring to the performance is a skill that is, of all musical talents, the most
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ordinary – a point that the play itself makes. Their very ordinariness, night after
night, is arguably what makes them a fixed point of reference for us. The Boy’s
identity shifts; Claire’s response to the events shifts too; but the choir, during the
performance, remain stubbornly, humanly, themselves. And they are local; when
the tour moves on, the choir remain, as we remain – no longer performers, but
left, as we are left, with the memory of the performance. Moreover, when they are
foregrounded in the performance, what they create is something which is first and
foremost affective, but which does not allow the audience a simple moment of
emotional catharsis. Affect is inflected by representation – in this case, the
representation of absence and trauma. No matter how effective they are as a
choir, the audience knows that they can never be more than ersatz; a temporary
assuaging of a loss which the play treats as both total and irredeemable.
In Theatres of Immanence, Cull discusses the idea of participation in perfor-
mance. She notes, following Carl Lavery, that the term itself is now so widely
applied as to seem meaningless; after all, performance is innately participatory.
She argues, however, that we should be very wary of limiting the use of the term
simply because it might make the nature of participation in theatre easier to
define and codify. Seen from the perspective of Deleuzian immanence, participa-
tion stops being a performance category, and reveals itself as a fundamental part
of the mechanisms of performance:
[An] immanent perspective is inherently participatory in outlook – not only thinking in
terms of a continuum of tendencies between the two poles of immanent participation and
transcendent separation, but also construing participation (or immanence) as the more
fundamental of the two tendencies. Or again, according to thinkers of immanence, it is not
that we begin with separate things (such as ‘an actor’ and ‘an audience member’), which
then take part in each other in a manner that presents participation as derivative of the
participants. Rather, immanence suggests that participants are produced by processes of
participation. (146–47)
The Events, in performance, works by laying bare the mechanisms through which
the processes of participation create participants; the audience watches, and
participates in, a performance shaped partly by performers who are themselves
visibly negotiating the processes of performance, rather than employing learned
theatrical skills to efface those processes. The choir involve us in the production
of immanent participation; they do so by incarnating the ‘irruption of the real’
into the world of the play, and in doing so they force us into a judgement which is
both affective and ethical. They do not give us a Levinasian Other against which
to gauge our ethical response to the narrative. As Cull puts it, they, above all else,
give us a sense of humanness as an open quality – open both to the choir on stage
and to the potential choir in the audience. Claire’s offer, at the play’s end, is
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nominally to the members of a new choir; but it is also to the non-professional
performers surrounding her on stage – and as in production it is addressed to the
seated audience, it is also an inherently ethical offer to us: “Why don’t you sit
with us and if you feel like singing – sing” (68).
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